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Abstract: While social learning is widespread, indiscriminate copying of others is rarely 22 
beneficial. Theory suggests individuals should be selective in what, when and whom they 23 
copy, by following “social learning strategies” (SLSs). The SLS concept has stimulated 24 
extensive experimental work, integrated theory and empirical findings, and created impetus 25 
to the social learning and cultural evolution fields. However, the SLS concept needs updating 26 
to accommodate recent findings that individuals switch between strategies flexibly, that 27 
multiple strategies are deployed simultaneously, and that there is no one-to-one 28 
correspondence between psychological heuristics deployed and resulting population-level 29 
patterns. The field would also benefit from simultaneous study of mechanism and function. 30 
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SLSs provide a useful vehicle for bridge-building between cognitive psychology, 31 
neuroscience and evolutionary biology. 32 
 33 
Social Learning Strategies Shape What, When and Whom to Copy Learning that is 34 
facilitated by observation of, or interaction with, another individual or its products, is known 35 
as ‘social learning’ (see Glossary) [1, 2]. Social learning is common in animals [2], reaching 36 
its zenith in the uniquely powerful, cumulative and diverse culture of humanity (see [3]). 37 
Such social learning is undoubtedly partially reliant on the same, or similar, mechanisms as 38 
asocial learning (namely associative learning), although, we argue, social learning is not 39 
solely reliant on associative learning mechanisms (Box 1). While social learning (or copying) 40 
appears intuitively useful, over the last 30 years, researchers from several fields have 41 
increasingly come to recognize that it is not inherently adaptive. Certainly, animals 42 
(including humans) may gain fitness benefits by learning from others insofar as they acquire 43 
adaptive information while avoiding some of the costs associated with the acquisition of 44 
asocial information such as time/energy loss, opportunity costs and exposure to predation 45 
whilst engaging in trial-and-error learning. However, the use of social information does not 46 
guarantee success [4-7]. Theoretical models predict that social learning will not be employed 47 
in an indiscriminate manner [5, 8]. Instead, heuristics, or “social learning strategies” (SLSs) 48 
(also termed “transmission biases”), are expected to bias individuals to copy particular 49 
behaviours (“what” strategies), performed by specific others (“who” strategies), under 50 
suitable circumstances (“when” strategies) [5, 8].  51 
The SLS concept does not require that individuals be consciously aware of following 52 
a strategy and implies nothing about the underlying neural mechanisms [8]. Understanding 53 
the extent to which such strategies are products of evolution and/or learning requires detailed 54 
experimentation [9, 10]. Nonetheless, selectivity in social learning may have important 55 
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consequences, including facilitating the cultural inheritance of information and helping to 56 
promote cumulative culture by ensuring accurate copying of traits with high utility (whether 57 
instrumentally – ‘success bias’, or conventionally – ‘prestige bias’) as well as incorporation 58 
of novel beneficial modifications (‘payoff bias’) [11-13] (see Figure 1).  59 
Here, we evaluate the status of SLS research for a cognitive science audience, briefly 60 
summarizing theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, discussing challenges to the 61 
SLSs approach, and providing a perspective on future progress that emphasizes the need for 62 
interdisciplinary work integrating mechanism and function.  Our objective is to update and 63 
tighten the concept of SLSs and, in the process, build bridges between the disciplines that 64 
study social learning, including cognitive psychology (e.g. [14]), comparative psychology 65 
(e.g. [15, 16]), developmental psychology (e.g. [17]), anthropology (e.g. [18]), archaeology 66 
(e.g. [19]), behavioural ecology (e.g. [20]), neuroscience (e.g. [21]) evolutionary biology (e.g. 67 
[22]) and behavioural economics (e.g. [23]). 68 
  69 
Findings of Social Learning Strategy Research 70 
There is now evidence for various SLSs that shape when, what and whom to copy (Figure 1). 71 
Thus far, most species studied appear to show evidence of multiple SLSs. However, more 72 
systematic research is required to identify any phylogenetic patterns in the adoption of 73 
specific SLSs.  Here we give a non-exhaustive review. 74 
 75 
Copy when asocial learning would be costly 76 
Theoretical analyses conclude that, as the costs associated with acquiring accurate but 77 
expensive personal information increase, reliance upon less accurate but cheap social 78 
information should increase [5, 55]. Empirical support is provided by experimental studies of 79 
humans [9], bees [35], fishes [36] and monkeys [37], where individuals were found to be 80 
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more likely to use social information when the task difficulty (and thus the energetic or time 81 
costs of acquiring the task solution asocially) increased. For example, human subjects 82 
required to decide whether two pictures represented the same shape seen from different 83 
angles, or different shapes were more likely to choose to view social information on harder 84 
than easier trials, and after previously incurring high (versus low) costs of asocial information 85 
[9]. 86 
 87 
Copy when uncertain 88 
Other theory predicts that individuals should use social information when they are uncertain, 89 
either because they possess no relevant prior information as their prior personal information 90 
is unreliable or outdated [5], or because, in relative terms, the accumulated knowledge of 91 
conspecifics is more reliable [4]. Empirical studies have supported these ideas. High-fidelity 92 
copying is observed amongst children that lack relevant personal information (e.g., [13]). 93 
Children even copy causally irrelevant actions when they are confronted with a difficult task 94 
and are uncertain how to solve it [30]. Adult humans reporting low confidence in task-related 95 
decisions [9] or unreliable personal knowledge [56] are most likely to use social information. 96 
Subsequent analyses establish that copying when uncertain is an adaptive strategy in 97 
enhancing task success [9].  98 
 In addition to humans, uncertainty due to a lack of personal information has a 99 
powerful effect on increasing reliance on social learning across multiple taxa, including fish 100 
[27], chimpanzees [28] and ants [29]. Moreover, the opposite is also the case; children are 101 
more likely to innovate and devise a novel method when the demonstrated method is 102 
unreliable in providing rewards than when they observe reliable demonstration [17]. 103 
 104 
Other state-based strategies 105 
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The decision to use social information is affected by other factors, including the age, social 106 
rank, and reproductive state [57] of the learner. There is experimental evidence that children 107 
choose to use social information more than adults [17, 41], perhaps because task-relevant 108 
knowledge is accumulated during childhood. Similarly, infant and juvenile capuchin 109 
monkeys pay more attention to others’ foraging behavior than do adults [42], and likewise in 110 
chimpanzees individuals are most sensitive to socially learning nut-cracking [43], and 111 
humans or birds to learn speech or song [44] when juvenile. Low- and mid-ranking 112 
chimpanzees are more likely to use social information than high-ranking individuals [28], a 113 
pattern replicated in blue tits [45], and perhaps resulting from a tendency to attend to higher-114 
status individuals. Early-life stress (e.g. unpredictable food) can also shape social learning 115 
strategies later in life [58, 59]. Finally, empirical tests with bats [32], and bumblebees [33] 116 
indicate that individuals copy others when dissatisfied with the payoff of their current 117 
behaviour [34].  118 
 119 
Model-based biases or “who” strategies  120 
Another important insight of theoretical models is that social learning may be indirectly 121 
biased. That is, individuals may copy any aspect (e.g., the haircut or diet choices) of an 122 
individual who is, for example, of high status, whether or not that trait helped the model 123 
attain high status [5]. There is considerable empirical evidence for model-based biases in 124 
both humans and other animals. For example, children prefer to copy high-status individuals, 125 
where status is evidenced by their older age, popularity and social dominance [47], and they 126 
distinguish between unfamiliar adults, copying the most ‘prestigious’ (or most attended to) 127 
amongst them [48]. Moreover, for the acquisition of skills children prefer to copy adults over 128 
their same-age peers, even when the peer appears to have greater task-relevant knowledge 129 
than the adult [12]. Adults also display prestige-bias. For example, Fijian villagers trust the 130 
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advice of a successful yam grower with regard to a different domain, use of medicinal plants 131 
[11].  132 
In non-humans, capuchins preferentially attend to and learn from older and higher-133 
ranking over younger/lower-ranking individuals [42], whilst chimpanzees preferentially 134 
observe and copy dominants [46, 28] as well as those with a history of proficiency in similar 135 
tasks [46, 49]. These strategies are heuristics thought to lead to the copying of successful 136 
individuals (e.g., in reaching older ages or higher dominance rank), who are assumed to 137 
display behavioural traits worth adopting.  138 
 139 
Frequency-dependent biases or “copy the majority” strategies 140 
A positive frequency-dependent bias (aka “conformist transmission”, “copy-the-majority”) 141 
occurs when the most common variant in a population is disproportionately more likely to be 142 
adopted, allowing individuals to benefit from others’ collective wisdom. Whether and under 143 
what circumstances individuals are expected to display this bias has excited controversy 144 
amongst theoreticians [5, 52, 57], and the empirical evidence is somewhat equivocal [9, 52, 145 
60]. A key, though hotly debated, question is whether the behaviour of the majority of 146 
individuals should be copied, not simply the behaviour seen most [62-64]. In agreement with 147 
the emphasis on individuals rather than behaviour, children and chimpanzees will copy the 148 
behavior demonstrated by three different individuals over the behavior demonstrated, three 149 
times, by one individual [65]. To some extent, the debate is alleviated by recognition that 150 
conformity is often just one of several simultaneous influences on behavior (see Multiple 151 
strategies are deployed simultaneously and Figure 1) and is sensitive to context. Children 152 
show higher-fidelity imitation when demonstrations involve two simultaneous models, rather 153 
than one model [66]. Likewise, children will copy with higher fidelity when provided with 154 
linguistic cues indicating there is a convention to be followed compared to when instrumental 155 
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language cues are provided [66, 67]. Other studies of humans suggest the likelihood of 156 
conforming is context- [52] and individual-dependent [53], and sensitive to whether the 157 
demonstrators have obtained their information from independent sources or from each other 158 
[14].  159 
 160 
Content-dependent biases or “what” strategies 161 
Content-dependent (aka “direct”) strategies express biases regarding what is learned, with 162 
individuals adopting behaviors following direct assessment of the (relative or perceived) 163 
value of the trait. This assessment can be based on the nature of the information itself, or its 164 
effectiveness. In the former case, humans express a preference for social (e.g. relationships) 165 
over physical (e.g. the weather/environment) content when transmitting stories, urban 166 
legends, or gossip [68, 24], and for content that evokes strong emotions (e.g., disgust), or of 167 
survival relevance [24]. Such preferences are usually referred to as content biases. The payoff 168 
associated with a trait is also known to affect transmission (‘payoff bias’ [e.g. 70]). There is 169 
empirical evidence of preferences for more effective solutions (i.e. copy a trait if its payoff is 170 
better than your own) across a range of species, including sticklebacks [69], and chimpanzees 171 
[25, 70, 71].  172 
 173 
Novel Insights from Theoretical and Empirical Findings  174 
Several key insights have emerged over the recent years of intensive investigation of SLSs.  175 
These include findings of considerable flexibility in the use of SLSs at both the individual 176 
and population level, and of several SLSs being deployed simultaneously.  Accordingly, it is 177 
now understood that population-level patterns are not necessarily indicative of particular 178 
SLSs.  Finally as SLSs are imperfect heuristics, they can result in the acquisition and spread 179 
of maladaptive behaviour. 180 
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 181 
Flexible strategy use 182 
Social learning strategies, and the behaviours that underpin them, are subject to natural 183 
selection. This has led some researchers to characterize SLSs as implying inflexible decision 184 
rules [72], but the fact that a strategy may have evolved does not imply anything about the 185 
flexibility of the behaviour it generates (nor is flexible use of SLSs evidence that the SLS has 186 
not evolved) [73]. Several recent studies have shown that individuals from the same 187 
population can adopt different strategies depending on subtle differences in context [74], 188 
developmental experience [59, 75], or other inter-individual variation [76, 77] accounting for 189 
different patterns of behaviour. For instance, whom children copy (e.g. parents vs peers) 190 
varies with task domain [74], with new skills learned preferentially from adults, but toy, 191 
clothing and dietary preferences disproportionately learned from other children. Likewise, 192 
children’s learning strategies change as they age, with younger children influenced by 193 
unanimity, but older children sensitive to majorities [78]. Moreover, there is increasing 194 
evidence for cultural variation in reliance on social learning due to cultural differences in 195 
experience during ontogeny, for example regarding care-giving practices [79], pedagogical 196 
styles [80] or other emphases [81]. In humans, cumulative culture relies on psychological 197 
adaptations that are “sufficiently flexible to support the acquisition of highly variable 198 
behavioural repertoires” [82 pg 7877]. Together, these findings need not imply active or 199 
executive control of decision-making, although that is a possibility. Hence SLSs are best 200 
regarded as biases shaping behaviour, not hard-and-fast rules blindly applied across all 201 
individuals or contexts.   202 
 203 
Multiple strategies are deployed simultaneously 204 
9 
 
There is now clear evidence for multiple strategies being deployed by the same species (e.g. 205 
humans, [83]; capuchins, [75]), often simultaneously (chimpanzees, [28]; sticklebacks, [36]; 206 
humans, [9]; Figure 1). For example, young children can combine different model-based 207 
biases (specifically “copy adults over peers” and “copy knowledgeable over ignorant 208 
individuals”) contingent on whether the specific model characteristics intersect [12]. 209 
Learning biases can also interact flexibly to produce effective decision-making and higher 210 
payoffs in adults (e.g. individuals conform to the majority only when there is good consensus 211 
amongst demonstrators; [9], Figure 1). One study alone has provided evidence for the 212 
simultaneous deployment of nine strategies across a population of human adults [9], implying 213 
that SLSs likely operate in concert as biases rather than being combined into fine-grained 214 
decision rules [2] (although we note that most studies lack the resolution to distinguish 215 
between different individuals pursuing alternative strategies and individuals pursuing 216 
multiple strategies simultaneously). These findings undermine any research agenda dedicated 217 
to working out the strategy implemented by a particular species. Rather, the challenge is to 218 
determine the complex of strategic copying influences that shape behavior in any given 219 
instance. 220 
 221 
Psychological heuristics and population-level patterns 222 
In the SLS literature the term ‘strategy’ has often been used to describe both the 223 
psychological rule deployed by the learner and the pattern of behavior that this rule produces 224 
across the population. However, this has proven problematic, since studies have established 225 
that there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the two. For example, 226 
theory predicts that the conformist rule “copy the majority behavior” results in the 227 
disproportionate adoption of popular traits at the expense of rare traits, producing at the 228 
population level an S-shaped relationship between trait frequency and probability of adoption 229 
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[5]. However, conformist social learning does not result in the expected (S-shaped) 230 
population-level outcome when other, simultaneously operating, biases have a masking effect 231 
[9]. Humans are only seen to be conforming to the majority when the effects of other biases 232 
have been statistically removed [9]. This insight helps to explain conflicting findings over the 233 
extent of conformity. 234 
Likewise, strategies such as “copy kin”, “copy friends”, “copy dominants”, 235 
or where preferences differ between individuals (e.g. for dog breeds, or baby names), can 236 
result in population- level patterns that resemble random or “unbiased” copying (e.g. [84]) or, 237 
indeed, conformist transmission [63]. Given that multiple learning rules can generate the 238 
same population- level pattern, whilst a particular learning rule can generate multiple 239 
population- level outcomes, it is recommended that the term ‘strategy’ be restricted 240 
to cognitive rules and not population- level patterns of behavior  [2]. 241 
 242 
Herding and the spread of misinformation 243 
When the cost of collecting personal information and of individually vetting every trait for its 244 
potential contribution to fitness is prohibitive, individuals may rely on imperfect heuristics 245 
that enable them to adopt reasonably good behaviour through social learning now. As a 246 
consequence, some maladaptive behaviours will be acquired [85]. For example, reliance on 247 
social learning has resulted in the copying of obviously causally irrelevant behaviours in 248 
children (e.g., [17, 86, 87]) and potentially the recent spread of fake news, where content-249 
dependent biases may play an important role [88]. Maladaptive information cascades [4], 250 
whereby individuals disregard their own personal information in favour of following the 251 
decisions of others (not the cues on which those decisions are based), may also occur.  This 252 
may explain the explosive spread of behaviours such as economic market crashes, mob 253 
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violence, panic rushes in crowds and even suicides, as well as the existence of witchcraft and 254 
fake medical treatments [85, 89, 90]. 255 
  256 
Challenges to the Social Learning Strategy concept 257 
The strong empirical support for strategic copying has not prevented the SLS concept from 258 
attracting criticism. Below we consider some major criticisms, which require a clarification 259 
and updating of the SLS concept. 260 
 261 
Do SLSs imply domain-specific mechanisms?  262 
Comparative psychologists have claimed that the SLS perspective encourages the conclusion 263 
that SLSs are reliant on ‘specialised’, ‘evolved’ or ‘domain-specific’ mechanisms that 264 
deploy ‘conscious’, ‘voluntary’ decision-making [72, 91, 10, 16]. It has been claimed that 265 
such assumptions could be leading the field astray as such authors suggest that domain-266 
general associative processes could also account for the findings of SLS experiments. Prima 267 
facie, this criticism would seem an attribution error, perhaps a consequence of differences 268 
between fields in their use of terms such as ‘evolved’ (which, as we deploy it, applies to 269 
exaptations and products of cultural evolution, not solely biological adaptations). The SLS 270 
literature has been explicit from the outset in disavowing any commitment to mechanism, or 271 
to conscious decision-making. The paper that introduced the SLS concept states [7 p5]:  272 
 273 
“In accordance with behavioral ecologists’ use of the phenotypic gambit (Grafen, 274 
1984), it does not matter whether animals adopt such strategies as a consequence of 275 
evolved psychological mechanisms, learning, culture, or some combination of 276 
processes” and “the adoption of such strategies would not require that the animals be 277 
aware that they are following a strategy, nor that they understand why such strategies 278 
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may work.”  279 
 280 
 The subsequent SLS literature is replete with statements along these lines (e.g., [69, 281 
92, 9, 93, 2, 77], highlighting SLSs researchers are not committed to the hypotheses that the 282 
behavior is unlearned, under tight genetic control, nor that decision making is conscious. 283 
Naturally, the neutrality of the SLS concept does not preclude experimental findings 284 
suggesting the possibility of social learning adaptations. Recent research with children, 285 
chimpanzees, and gorillas may provide evidence of evolved aspects of SLSs; individuals 286 
showed enhanced learning from animate (compared to inanimate) models, which was not 287 
merely due to changes in input mechanisms (e.g. reduced attention), but to greater depth of 288 
encoding and enhanced memory with socially mediated events [94].  This may be due to an 289 
‘agentive match’ between model and observer [94], implying some SLSs may be 290 
manifestations of evolved enhancements in memory for, and thus replication of, the actions 291 
of specific models, mediated by relatability of goal-directed actions between observer and 292 
model (also see Box 1). 293 
However, any claim that the evolutionary reasoning of SLS leads researchers to 294 
expect that closely related species should exhibit similar strategies [72] is highly contentious. 295 
While closely related species are generally expected to exhibit trait similarities, behavioural 296 
traits are renowned for being evolutionarily labile. Experimental studies have shown different 297 
SLS use in closely related species, different populations of the same species [95, 109], and 298 
different individuals within a group [76, 77], whilst other studies imply that ecology may be 299 
more influential in SLS distribution than phylogenetic relatedness [92, 110]. There is a need 300 
for further research on the relationship between phylogenetic relatedness and SLS use, but 301 
the prevailing evidence suggests that, due to the demonstrated flexibilities in employment of 302 
SLSs, their study requires no commitment to the nativist stance that SLSs are unlearned.    303 
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 304 
Are SLSs an alternative to associative learning? 305 
The misattribution of domain-specific explanations to SLS studies has led to associative 306 
learning theory (henceforth ALT) being juxtaposed as providing alternative domain-general 307 
explanations to SLSs [91, 10, 16, 72]. There is no question that the findings of social learning 308 
experiments can often be explained by associative learning, but SLS and ALT are not 309 
alternatives. SLSs provide a functional account of behaviour; they are explicitly mechanism-310 
neutral, and no substitute for thorough analysis of mechanism. This is implicit in the 311 
literature, as SLS studies commonly deploy asocial learning controls, and consider ALT 312 
explanations for the results (e.g. [95, 32, 27]; see Box 2).  313 
The possibility that ALT could underlie SLS findings does not, however, constitute 314 
evidence that alternative mechanistic explanations are wrong, as some researchers have 315 
implied [72, 91]. For instance, researchers have argued that between-species differences in 316 
social learning, such as differences between humans and chimpanzees in imitation, reflect 317 
differences in ‘input mechanisms’ (i.e. perceptual or motivational factors), on the assumption 318 
that both species exhibit the same ALT learning processes [91]. However, it would seem 319 
implausible, given the extensive evidence for neurological and genetic differences between 320 
these species (e.g. [108, 110]), to suggest motivational variation could fully explain the 321 
differences in social learning between chimpanzees and humans. Equally, the possibility that 322 
humans learn through the same mechanism(s) as nonhumans, but with enhanced 323 
computational power resulting in faster operation and differing behavioural effects, merits 324 
attention [108].  325 
 326 
Is “blackboxing” of mechanism bad? 327 
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SLS research has relied heavily on an assumption known as the “behavioural gambit”, the 328 
idea that mechanisms of implementation do not greatly constrain the adaptive behavioural 329 
rules that evolve [20]. This assumption has stimulated extensive theoretical work, which in 330 
turn allows SLS theory (e.g. [112, 113, 6, 34]) to guide a great deal of empirical research 331 
[110, 93, 70]. However, other researchers have expressed concern that this ‘blackboxing’ of 332 
mechanism is ‘no longer a tenable scientific strategy’ [15, p2]. Is this the case, or have the 333 
perils been overstated?  334 
The critique focuses on the findings of a computer-based tournament that pitted 335 
learning strategies against each other in an evolutionary simulation [114]. The tournament 336 
revealed how individuals performing the highest-payoff behaviour in their repertoire 337 
inadvertently filter information for others to copy. Thus, social learning will be favoured in 338 
any exploration/exploitation dilemma, if there is an opportunity cost to exploration (asocial 339 
learning) and individuals can select the best behaviour known to them for exploitation. This 340 
general adaptiveness of social learning is an important explanation for the ubiquity of social 341 
learning in the animal kingdom [114]. 342 
The conclusion that social learning is adaptive across a broad range of conditions, a 343 
robust finding of experimental studies and formal theory [2, 5, 83, 93, 115], has nonetheless 344 
been described as ‘misleading’. Critics argue that some asocial learning in the tournament 345 
(where individuals asocially obtained information about the payoff of a behaviour they had 346 
already learned by performing it) was not properly accounted for in the analysis and 347 
interpretation of the tournament results, effectively obscuring (or,‘blackboxing’) an important 348 
source of asocial information, and leading to an unwarranted emphasis on social learning 349 
[15]. However, this argument is problematic, in two respects. First, it does not distinguish 350 
between two classes of learning represented in the tournament – learning how to perform a 351 
behaviour and learning its payoff – when the claims regarding the superiority of social 352 
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learning were related explicitly, and specifically, to the former. Unravelling how individuals 353 
decide which of a virtually infinite set of behaviours to learn is a serious scientific challenge, 354 
in comparison to which updating payoffs received for established behaviour appears 355 
straightforward. Second, and more importantly, disagreement over how to interpret learning 356 
about payoffs reflects little on the perils or merits of ‘blackboxing’. The tournament 357 
organizers decided that details of exactly how learning about payoffs happened were 358 
peripheral to the analysis, and so these were abstracted out. Theoretical models must always 359 
strike a balance between accurately representing the process being studied and incorporating 360 
those assumptions that are judged critical, while deciding which details to leave out. In this 361 
respect, the critique of ‘blackboxing’ applies to any mathematical model. It is, of course, 362 
quite legitimate to evaluate any model on the extent to which it has accurately captured the 363 
key components of the process being studied. Nevertheless, it is a big step indeed to build on 364 
such critiques a proposal that the entire approach of not modelling every mechanism in detail 365 
is scientifically ‘untenable’. 366 
Whilst systematically and uncritically ignoring mechanism would indeed be 367 
problematic, evolutionary researchers are not unaware of these pitfalls – indeed there is 368 
active debate within the field about the issue (e.g. [20]). There is no doubt that research on 369 
the neural mechanisms of social learning is important, but we note that such research itself 370 
attests to the underlying biological reality of SLS, as well as neural adaptations for social 371 
learning competences (particularly in humans). Some of the very latest neuroscience research 372 
is revealing just how profoundly social interactions are embedded in human and nonhuman 373 
brains. For example, there is growing, and methodologically diverse, evidence indicating that 374 
a brain region known as the ACCg (the anterior cingulate cortex lying in the gyrus) is 375 
specialised for the processing of social information in humans and nonhumans, with 376 
ramifications specifically for SLSs (see Box 3). Likewise, ‘evolutionary neuroscience’ 377 
16 
 
experiments indicate that differences between primate species (including humans) in neural 378 
connectivity and responsivity of the mirror system link to species differences in the capacity 379 
for imitation and social learning of tool use [121].  In macaques and chimpanzees, most of 380 
this circuitry consists of frontal–temporal connections, whilst humans have more substantial 381 
temporal–parietal and frontal–parietal connections. Moreover, humans’ comparatively 382 
expanded and plastic association cortex [122] may imply a greater role for developmental 383 
scaffolding [123] upon brain architecture underlying social learning capacities in humans 384 
versus nonhumans (but see [124]). Finally, connectome studies are revealing dedicated 385 
networks of neural connections underlying behavioral innovation [125], that link to regions 386 
of the primate brain (such as the lateral prefrontal cortex) that have expanded 387 
disproportionately during human evolution [126].  Such neuroscientific studies highlight how 388 
functional and mechanistic perspectives are complementary. Moreover, they leave the 389 
hypothesis that social learning abilities underlying SLSs derive solely from selection on input 390 
mechanisms (e.g. attention or motivation) [91] increasingly untenable.  391 
 392 
Metacognitive SLSs 393 
It has been suggested [16] that the primary difference between cultural evolution in humans 394 
and other animals is that humans alone possess domain-specific metacognitive SLSs, 395 
whereby individuals consciously assess who is knowledgeable, which in turn influences 396 
whom is copied (see Box 4). In reality, the discrepancies between humans and other animals 397 
in this domain are multifaceted, and almost certainly reflect the aforementioned substantial 398 
evolved differences in the neural architecture of human brains [108], rather than a single 399 
cognitive competence. Nonetheless, an important role for metacognition in human culture is 400 
highly plausible. One possibility is that human-unique metacognitive SLSs produce 401 
reportable representations of ‘who knows’, thereby supporting the cultural inheritance of 402 
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‘wise’ SLSs dictating high-fidelity copying from recognized experts (and avoiding copying 403 
amateurs), which over generations promotes cumulative cultural evolution [16]. Importantly, 404 
for arguments that emphasize the importance of culture for the ecological dominance of 405 
humanity [135-137], these metacognitive strategies enable individuals to copy the best trait in 406 
a given domain, despite the reason for its success being cognitively opaque. By allowing 407 
inferences to be made about the goals and intentions of others, a metacognitive capability 408 
potentially affords more accurate reconstruction of the nature of the task to be copied, whilst 409 
the same capabilities potentially help tutors tailor their teaching and scaffolding to pupils’ 410 
knowledge levels. Although SLSs have thus far been constrained to the perspective of the 411 
learner, it might be fruitful to explore how SLSs may be extended to include strategic 412 
information provisioning by experts.  413 
While the ‘metacognition underlies human culture’ argument was presented as an 414 
alternative to a SLS explanation [16], this juxtaposition is misleading, both because to our 415 
knowledge, no strong claims about SLSs underlying human-animal differences appear in the 416 
literature, and because metacognition itself may be a mechanism underpinning some SLSs. 417 
The SLS concept covers a diversity of mechanisms for achieving efficient social learning, 418 
from genetically heritable variation between individuals through to the social learning of 419 
social learning [75] and the cultural diversity the latter entails [81, 136]. Given that the 420 
phylogenetic distribution of metacognition is an active area of research [138], it would seem 421 
premature simply to assume that “all animal behaviour … conforming to SLSs, is based on 422 
domain-general processes of associative learning” ([16, p209] emphasis added; see Box 1).  423 
Nonetheless, increased attention to the role of metacognition in social learning and teaching, 424 
in humans and other animals, is required (see Box 4). The hypothesis that metacognitive 425 
SLSs are uniquely human merits further attention. 426 
 427 
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Concluding Remarks 428 
The SLS perspective has proven productive not least because the approach provides a vehicle 429 
for integrating cognitive, behavioural and evolutionary perspectives, as well as empirical 430 
work and theory. A complete understanding of behaviour requires that (at least) four 431 
questions are addressed [139]. Analyses of social learning and cultural evolution that focus 432 
on function to the exclusion of mechanism are necessarily incomplete. However, SLS 433 
researchers have conducted numerous investigations of social learning mechanisms, 434 
including drawing on associative learning interpretations (e.g. [107, 140, 141]). To move 435 
forward, what is now required are not retrospective narrative accounts but experimental tests, 436 
based upon a priori specification of differing predictions, designed to distinguish purported 437 
alternative explanations of social learning behaviour (see Outstanding Questions). There are 438 
exciting opportunities for integrating functional, evolutionary, developmental and 439 
mechanistic analyses in this domain, for example, by exploring the mechanistic and 440 
neuroscientific bases of strategy use (Box 3), studying how learning strategies change over 441 
developmental time as cognitive capabilities change, investigating the phylogenetic 442 
distribution and adaptive value of the use of a particular SLS, and exploring the role of 443 
metacognition in human culture (Box 4). The advantages of interdisciplinary work in these 444 
domains extend beyond the benefits that return to social learning researchers. For instance, it 445 
may be possible for developmental psychologists, comparative psychologists and cognitive 446 
neuroscientists to make sense of population or individual differences in cognitive 447 
development or neural connectivity in terms of alternative SLS deployment. Likewise, 448 
species differences in brain architecture, and its development throughout ontogeny, will 449 
likely be strongly tied to the details of the functional questions those brains have evolved to 450 
answer. In comparison to the cruder categories of ‘social learning’ or ‘imitation’, 451 
specification of SLSs characterizes, for instance, whether the learner will be attending to 452 
19 
 
payoff, consensus, or status information, each of which are seemingly associated with 453 
distinctive patterns of neural connectivity (Box 3). Given their impressive track record of 454 
integrating empirical and theoretical insights, as well as findings from behavioural and 455 
evolutionary biology, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental psychology, SLSs 456 
potentially provide a useful vehicle for bridge-building between fields. 457 
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Figure 1. Summarising identified social learning strategies and their use (a) Social 798 
learning strategies for which there is significant theoretical or empirical support (based on 799 
Figure 1 in [93]). The tree structure is purely conceptual and does not imply similarity of 800 
cognition. Sources are purely for illustration as recent literature entry points for 801 
readers (see [93] for additional illustrative sources). (b) The panels, which derive from an 802 
experimental study of human social learning [9], illustrate how behavioural outputs can result 803 
from the simultaneous deployment of multiple social learning strategies. The left panel shows 804 
how subjects’ decisions were affected by both their personal confidence and consensus 805 
amongst demonstrators, whilst the right panel shows the combined effects of the number of 806 
demonstrators and the consensus among them. Based on Figure 2a (left) and 2b (right) in [9]. 807 
 808 
 809 
 810 
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BOX 1: Mechanisms of asocial and social learning  811 
 812 
Some authors have proposed that associative learning mechanisms can explain all social 813 
learning, and even suggested that the term ‘social learning’ is misleading because the 814 
underlying mechanisms are not distinctively social [91, 10]. Attributing social learning only 815 
to associative learning mechanisms, however, relies on a narrower definition of social 816 
learning than standard [1, 2], excluding language and teaching which are reliant on specialist 817 
mechanisms. Here we review key evidence regarding the debate. 818 
Social learning in ‘asocial’ species  has been interpreted as evidence that social 819 
learning relies on only asocial mechanisms [91, 10]. However, social learning from 820 
heterospecifics is well-established [95, 96], and all animals, even solitary, are exposed to 821 
social information (observation/products), from mates, broodmates, or territorial neighbours 822 
[97]. Hence, it is dubious to infer that solitary species should not experience selection for 823 
social learning, or that their social learning relies on asocial mechanisms only.  We may, 824 
however, ask how evolutionary histories of group-living shape social learning’s evolution 825 
[97]. Currently, it is not known whether social species exhibit evolved enhancements in 826 
social learning. 827 
Social and asocial learning abilities co-vary across primates [98], but this does not 828 
negate the possibility of separate capacities that have coevolved.  The correlation is 829 
imperfect, leaving variation potentially explainable by evolved adaptive specialization in 830 
social learning, as seen in vocal learning in songbirds, cetaceans and humans [99], public-831 
information use in sticklebacks [95], and teaching in humans and other animals ([97] See Box 832 
4). Experimental studies are equivocal, with some reporting a positive (humans: [101]; birds: 833 
[45]), and others a negative (sparrows: [102]; marmosets: [103]), relationship between asocial 834 
and social learning performance. 835 
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 Bumblebee research is enlightening here. It has been hypothesised that social 836 
learning is second-order conditioning whereby bees associate conspecific presence with 837 
reward and then associate conspecifics with a rewarding flower colour [104]. However, 838 
bumblebees learn differently when trained with social versus inanimate cues [105], and rely 839 
on social, over asocial, learning when tasks are complex [35] or the environment variable 840 
[106]. These experiments and ‘ghost controls’ in several other species [107] indicate animals 841 
respond differently to social and asocial information, again implying that enhancements in 842 
social learning performance can evolve.  843 
Although there is undoubtedly overlap between social and asocial learning, whether 844 
(language and teaching aside) they rely entirely on the same mechanisms remains unknown. 845 
Indeed, for many social species learning occurs more frequently in social than asocial 846 
contexts. These species may have experienced selection for proficient social learning, with 847 
enhanced asocial learning likely a by-product (e.g. humans [108].)  848 
 849 
 850 
BOX 2:  Storytelling and Science: Contention over SLS experimental investigations  851 
 852 
 853 
Criticisms of SLS experiments by learning theorists [72] have sparked debate. Here, we 854 
present three illustrative studies, then draw out general points. 855 
 856 
1. Foraging frog-eating bats learn novel prey cues socially more readily when cues are 857 
rewarded only 50% of the time compared to 100% of the time (a ‘copy-if-dissatisfied’ or 858 
‘copy-when-asocial- information- is-unreliable’ SLS) [32]. Learning theorists suggested that 859 
social learning in the 50%-rewarded treatment may have been an artefact of bats being more 860 
likely to visit the demonstrated cue source than in the 100%-rewarded treatment because 861 
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intermittently-rewarded stimuli are less attractive [72]. However, the findings of an asocial 862 
control treatment rule out this explanation.  863 
 864 
2. A species difference in public-information use. Three- and ninespine sticklebacks 865 
experienced two groups of fish feeding at different rates (rich and poor prey patches). Later, 866 
when tested in the absence of demonstrators, only ninespines showed a preference for the rich 867 
patch, perhaps because ninespines face greater predation risk than threespines (a ‘copy-when-868 
collecting-asocial- information- is-costly’ SLS) [95]. Learning theorists suggested this finding 869 
is an artefact of fish detecting that more prey were delivered at the rich patch [72]. This 870 
explanation is not credible because (i) the design explicitly prevented observers from seeing 871 
food, (ii) fish cannot locate the rich patch using odour cues alone [95], and (iii) later studies 872 
using watertight chambers to house demonstrators and feeders separately obtain identical 873 
results [111]. Moreover, the associative learning (ALT) account cannot explain the between-874 
species differences in public-information use under identical conditions.  875 
 876 
3. Minnows were more likely to use social information when predation risk was high (a 877 
‘copy-when-asocial- learning- is-costly’ SLS) [39]. Learning theorists proposed that predation 878 
risk caused conditioned suppression of the feeder-food association, reducing foraging 879 
motivation, leading fish to approach areas where conspecifics had been [72].  This is 880 
extremely unlikely as fish perceiving risks are more likely to remain in cover than join shoals 881 
in the open (see [39]). 882 
 883 
 ALT is a powerful explanatory tool, which can be fruitfully deployed to understand 884 
findings from social learning experiments. However, these examples illustrate how the utility 885 
of ALT does not guarantee that a particular ALT explanation is correct. The general point 886 
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here is that mechanistic perspectives that ignore functional insights are no less prone to error 887 
than functional perspectives that ignore mechanism. To move the field forward, rather than 888 
retrospective ALT storytelling, researchers must integrate perspectives and experimentally 889 
compare the relative merits of alternative mechanistic explanations for particular exhibited 890 
strategies.  891 
 892 
 893 
BOX 3:  The Neurobiology of Strategic Copying 894 
 895 
Social neuroscientists now recognize ‘deep homology’ in the mechanisms and structures of 896 
the ‘social brain’ across diverse taxa [115], whilst primatologists emphasize how the brain of 897 
primates, particularly with respect to encephalization and the neural basis of imitation, is 898 
organized for ‘socio-cultural’ processing [116]. That social interactions are embedded in 899 
brains is also highlighted by the emerging field of ‘network neuroscience’, which argues that 900 
neural networks within the brain exhibit reciprocal interaction with social networks in the 901 
environment: neural activities shape patterns of learning and behaviour in people’s social 902 
networks, which in turn feed back to influence individuals’ brain structure and function 903 
[117]. Human brains spontaneously encode social network positions of familiar others, 904 
highlighting how navigating complex social interactions could influence brain development 905 
and evolution [118] and hinting at rapid unconscious (see Box 4) processes underlying 906 
model-based SLSs in humans and nonhumans. Collectively, these findings imply that the use 907 
of particular social learning strategies within a population may lead to characteristic patterns 908 
of neural connectivity within individual brains, potentially with signatures of implemented 909 
strategies manifest across diverse animal groups. 910 
Increasingly, neuroscientific data are pointing to dedicated mechanisms for social 911 
learning. For instance, Hill et al. [119] discovered that the portion of the anterior cingulate 912 
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cortex lying in the gyrus (ACCg) of humans showed neuronal activity corresponding to 913 
reinforcement (or trial-and-error) learning, but only when monitoring the behaviour of others.  914 
This allocentric pattern is distinct from other regions, implying it signals information crucial 915 
to social learning [21].  Neurophysiology, neuroimaging, lesion studies and those of 916 
individuals with autistic spectrum disorder, all indicate a specialisation in the ACCg for 917 
processing social information in humans and nonhumans [120]. Other medial prefrontal 918 
cortex (mPFC) subregions mostly signal in an egocentric frame or in both egocentric and 919 
allocentric frames.  Thus these regions may contribute to integrating information regarding 920 
one’s own actions and those of others to update behaviour [21], potentially underlying copy if 921 
better SLSs. Likewise, considering frequency-dependent SLSs, there is evidence that the 922 
magnitude of activity in the anterior insula, rostral cingulate zone, and ventral striatum in 923 
response to consensus/non-consensus between demonstrators or between self and 924 
demonstrators predicts changes in an individual’s behaviour (see [58] for a review).  It 925 
remains to be established to what extent different people, societies and species implement the 926 
same behavioural strategies in different ways in their brains, but this issue affords rich 927 
opportunities for comparative work. 928 
 929 
 930 
BOX 4:  Metacognition and Social Learning Strategies 931 
 932 
 933 
Metacognition is a sophisticated cognitive capacity developing late in human ontogeny [127], 934 
considered uniquely human by some [16]. It uses forms of learning (e.g. ALT) and/or other 935 
aspects of cognition (e.g. memory, mental simulation) to generate responses not directly 936 
related to them (i.e. thinking about thinking). Metacognition is thus sometimes labelled a 937 
system 2 process, being top-down (executively controlled), available to conscious awareness, 938 
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in contrast to and serving to augment system 1 activities which are bottom-up (stimulus 939 
driven), involuntary and based on information from genetic inheritance or associative 940 
learning (dual-process theory [128]).  For example, humans may express their confidence (a 941 
metacognitive output) regarding their own abilities, verbally or physically (e.g. shrugging 942 
shoulders), or possess knowledge about what others know.   943 
 The extent to which metacognitive capacities are seen in nonhumans is relevant to our 944 
understanding of their levels of self-awareness and evolution of the human mind. Although 945 
nonhuman abilities may be less varied and sophisticated (e.g. [129]) than humans’, there is 946 
evidence in pigeons, rats, monkeys and apes for monitoring of knowledge, uncertainty and 947 
memory, as well as confidence levels (reviewed in [130]). For example, chimpanzees make 948 
spontaneous confidence judgements regarding the likelihood that they performed accurately 949 
enough in a task to gain a reward, and adjust their behaviour accordingly [130]. Likewise, 950 
strategic information seeking in nonhumans, where ALT explanations are discounted [131], 951 
reflects a response to perceived uncertainty. For example, orangutans and chimpanzees 952 
demonstrate that they know when they don’t know which of three tools is appropriate to reach 953 
a reward (due to their length being occluded) by changing position to determine this [132]. 954 
 Whether explicit metacognitive capacities are manifest in SLSs, such that the 955 
accuracy and reliability of cognitive processes in the self and others is consciously assessed 956 
[16], is open to question. The majority of contexts where ‘copy when uncertain’ SLSs have 957 
been reported need not require explicit (versus implicit) metacognition, but other strategies 958 
representing ‘who knows’ (e.g. chimpanzees: [49]; humans: [133, 134]) might. While no 959 
more an alternative to SLS than ALT, metacognition potentially affords unique learning 960 
strategies (especially if explicit). These include enabling accurate inference of others’ 961 
intentions and hence what to copy, and teaching that is contingent upon, or enhanced by, 962 
knowledge of the pupil’s level of understanding. Thus, metacognition may have played an 963 
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important role in human cognitive and cultural evolution, and may help to explain how 964 
humans teach across such a broad range of tasks, in contrast to the rare and specialist 965 
teaching reported in other animals [108, 100]. However, whether explicitly (conscious) 966 
metacognitive SLSs are unique to humans and must produce reportable (verbally or 967 
otherwise) representations of ‘who knows’ to promote culture [16], is currently difficult to 968 
assess.  969 
 970 
 971 
HIGHLIGHTS 972 
 973 
 Accumulating evidence supports theoretical predictions that humans and nonhumans are 974 
selective in what, when and whom they copy, suggesting the use of “social learning 975 
strategies” (SLSs). 976 
 Recent studies indicate that SLS use is flexible and changes with ontogeny, experience, 977 
state, and context.  978 
 Multiple SLSs may be adopted simultaneously in the same population, and even by the 979 
same individual. Individuals’ SLSs do not necessarily correspond to apparent population-980 
level patterns.  981 
 SLSs likely involve associative learning processes and social learning mechanisms; 982 
experimental controls indicate that associative learning alone cannot explain all SLS 983 
findings.  984 
 Recent neuroscientific data suggest the anterior cingulate cortex in the gyrus (ACCg) may 985 
be specialised for processing the social information of relevance to SLSs.  986 
 The role of metacognition in SLSs requires investigation. 987 
 988 
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OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS 989 
 990 
 What mechanisms underpin SLSs? Investigating the behavioral and 991 
neurobiological underpinnings of SLSs is central to progress in the field. Can we 992 
design studies with differing a priori predictions regarding learning mechanisms 993 
involved in SLSs? Feasibly, the types of tests (including ALT controls, Box 2) 994 
deployed with bumblebees (Box 1) could be extended to other systems. 995 
 Do particular SLSs involve characteristic neural circuitries? Do individuals, 996 
societies or species implement behavioural strategies in similar ways in their brains? 997 
Is there a characteristic connectome for each SLS? Can neurobiological studies (Box 998 
3) shed light on the role of ALT in SLSs implemented by different species? How is 999 
SLS use influenced by individual differences?  1000 
 How do SLSs develop over the lifetime? The ontogeny of SLSs is understudied yet 1001 
contributes to flexibility in SLS-use. How does the deployment of SLSs shift over 1002 
ontogeny? To what extent is this contingent on general aspects of brain and cognitive 1003 
development? How do individuals alter use of SLSs with personal experience and 1004 
changing context (e.g. stage of tradition formation)?  1005 
 What is the evolutionary history of SLSs? Can phylogenetic techniques (e.g. 1006 
comparative studies of SLSs in multiple pairs of closely related species) contribute to 1007 
the debate over the extent to which SLSs are evolved adaptations and/or learned 1008 
heuristics?  Do differing evolutionary histories of group-living influence the use or 1009 
sophistication of SLSs?  1010 
 What is the adaptive value of SLSs? SLSs likely vary in their fitness consequences  1011 
but this is understudied and relies on identifying SLSs in natural contexts. How do 1012 
SLSs affect foraging success and success in other domains (e.g. nest-building and 1013 
predator evasion)? 1014 
 What role does metacognition play in human culture? What is the phylogenetic 1015 
distribution of metacognitive SLSs (Box 4)? How do they promote culture? Is 1016 
knowledge of ‘who knows (what)’ critical for model-based SLSs and teaching? 1017 
 1018 
  1019 
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GLOSSARY   1020 
 1021 
Adaptive strategy:  a strategy that enhances survival and reproductive success of the 1022 
individual adopting it.  1023 
 1024 
Asocial learning (or Individual learning): learning for oneself through experience and/or 1025 
trial and error. 1026 
 1027 
Asocial Information (or Personal information): information acquired by an individual 1028 
through their own activities and interactions with the environment. 1029 
 1030 
Associative Learning Theory (ALT):  the process whereby individuals learn an association 1031 
between two stimuli (Classical or Pavlovian conditioning), or a behaviour and a stimulus 1032 
(Instrumental or Operant conditioning).  1033 
 1034 
Behavioural Gambit: the assumption that genetic architecture does not constrain the 1035 
evolution of behavioural phenotypes. An extension of the phenotypic gambit to the evolution 1036 
of behaviour [19, 115].    1037 
 1038 
Copying: synonym for social learning 1039 
 1040 
Cumulative Culture: a form of cultural evolution where individuals build upon the 1041 
knowledge of previous generations such that trait complexity, diversity or efficiency 1042 
increases across generations. Arguably unique to humans [116]. 1043 
 1044 
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Domain-General Processes: psychological mechanisms thought to have evolved not to 1045 
function in specific contexts but to be domain and taxonomically general. An example is 1046 
associative learning.  1047 
 1048 
Domain-Specific Processes: processes supported by specialised, and evolutionarily 1049 
specified, psychological mechanisms. Being evolved to solve problems in a particular 1050 
domain, sometimes perform poorly in other domains. Contrast with domain-general 1051 
processes. 1052 
 1053 
Four Questions: these define the complementary levels of analysis of behaviour proposed by 1054 
Niko Tinbergen in 1963 (see [84]).  They are often divided into two how questions: (1) How 1055 
does it work? (mechanism) and (2) How did it develop? (ontogeny), and two why questions: 1056 
(3) What is it for? (function or adaptation) and (4) How did it evolve? (phylogeny). 1057 
 1058 
Innovation: we adhere to existing definitions in recent literature [117, 118]: a new, useful, 1059 
learned behaviour that may be transmitted to others, arising from asocial learning alone or 1060 
in combination with social learning, that is produced to successfully solve a novel problem or 1061 
an existing problem in a novel manner. Novelty is often considered to be at the population 1062 
level. 1063 
 1064 
Metacognition: processes used to plan, monitor and evaluate one’s knowledge and 1065 
performance (e.g., thinking about thinking), or the knowledge/performance of others.  In the 1066 
context of SLSs metacognition refers to knowing who knows and knowing what is known.  1067 
 1068 
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Social Information: information acquired by an individual through some form of social 1069 
influence (including social learning). 1070 
 1071 
Social Learning: “learning that is facilitated by observation of, or interaction with, another 1072 
individual (or its products)” [1, p207]. 1073 
 1074 
Social Learning Strategies: flexible rules that specify or bias when or how individuals 1075 
should use social information, under various circumstances, to meet functional goals [7].  The 1076 
term ‘transmission biases’ has, similarly, been used [5] to detail when, what, and from whom 1077 
individuals acquire social information (see [77, 72]).  1078 
 1079 
 1080 
